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In the midst of a Republican sweep of the Presidency, House of Representatives and the Senate,
Democrats have turned to the filibuster as their final barrier against what they see as regressive
Republican policies. As John Rackey of the University of Oklahoma argues, however, the
Democrats’ turn to the obstructionist tool could backfire and lead to further diminished minority party
powers in Congress, leading to an unchecked Republican party passing the very laws the
Democrats seek to obstruct.
With Republicans retaining control of the House of Representatives as well as the Senate, and
gaining control of the White House, many Democratic supporters are turning to what they see as their last hope
against an onslaught of the Republican agenda: the filibuster. This immediate turn to the filibuster as a line of
defense for Democrats, only minutes after election results were announced, speaks to a fundamental
misunderstanding about the culture of the Senate. This also affects recent changes in the cloture rule have had in
the modern U.S. Senate.
The cloture rule
The filibuster is often mischaracterized as a rule that allows unlimited debate on measures pending on the floor of
the Senate. However, as Senate scholars note, it is also a loophole in Senate rules which prevents debate being cut
off. The one tool at a majority’s disposal to end filibusters has been Rule XXII, the cloture rule. The original rule,
instituted in 1917 after urging from President Wilson, required a two-thirds majority to invoke cloture. Since 1975,
invoking cloture has required 60 votes, a three-fifths majority. After cloture is invoked, there are currently thirty hours
of post-cloture debate before the measure can be voted on; this post-cloture debate is usually waived through use of
unanimous consent agreements between the majority and minority, which do not require a vote.
In November 2013, Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) led his majority in a reinterpretation of Senate Rule XXII to
lower the threshold for cloture to 51 votes, a simple majority, for non-Supreme Court level judges. The results of this
change in precedent have been widely analyzed Senate watchers of all stripes. The consensus has been that each
time reforms to the cloture rule have occurred to make it easier for the majority to overcome minority obstruction, the
number of filibusters that have taken place has increased. These new filibusters are easily ended; however, post-
cloture debate is rarely waived because the minority no longer has incentive to agree to the unanimous consent
agreement. They insist on usage of all thirty hours of post-cloture debate as a form of protest for their decreased
ability to filibuster; thus slowing the speed at which the Senate can act. It should be noted that post-cloture debate
rarely is executed on the floor, the measure is usually just tabled until the thirty hours have expired.
Prior to election night, polls were predicting that Democrats would take back the Senate and retain control of the
White House. Under that scenario, Democrats would have had to overcome minority party Republican filibusters on
many things, most notably, confirmation of Supreme Court justices. Retiring Minority Leader Harry Reid hinted that
there was precedent, after 2013, for Democrats to change cloture precedent again to lower the threshold from 60
votes to 51 votes for Supreme Court justices as they had previously done for lower court judges. This same option is
still on the table for Senate Republicans who now have the support of the executive branch. Previously, some
Senate Republicans, as part of a cloture reform taskforce assembled by Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY),
have suggested going beyond lowering the threshold not just for Supreme Court nominees, but also for legislation.
All of this is contingent upon a united Republican majority, which is far from a guarantee, though certainly more
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probable in the Senate than in the House. Should these changes be enacted, Senate Democrats would no longer
have any real way to stop, or even slow, a policy agenda set forth by Congressional Republicans and the Trump
White House. While the number of filibusters will surely increase should these changes to Rule XXII be rammed
through, their effectiveness will surely be diminished with cloture so readily invoked. The only way for Democrats to
avoid this scenario is by not immediately putting up a strong defense, centered around filibuster use, at the onset of
the 115th Congress. If they attempt to be pure obstructionists, as Republicans have been during much of the Obama
presidency, the stage is set for drastic changes to the cloture rule and a decrease in minority party rights in the
Senate. A decrease in minority party rights in the Senate on this scale will lead it to be all but indistinguishable from
the House of Representatives from a procedural standpoint, forever changing the nature of Congressional politics.
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